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THE CONCEPT OF NON-DUALITY 





ABSTRACT: When comparing diverse philosophical traditions, it becomes necessary to 
establish a common point of departure. This paper offers a comparative analysis of Advaita 
Vedānta Hinduism and esoteric Christianity, as represented by the two highly celebrated 
figures of Śaṅkara and Nicholas Cusanus, respectively. The common point of departure on 
which I base this comparison is the concept of “non-duality”—a concept that is fitting for at 
least two reasons. First, it is general enough to encompass both traditions, pervading the work 
of each figure, and thus allowing for a kind of “shared language.” Second, it is specific enough 
to identify a set of core and well-defined principles amenable to systematic study, chief among 
which are the notions of (1) the “Absolute” as an infinite unity that transcends all 
determinations (“no-thing”) and exceeds all oppositions (“not-other”), and (2) the world as 
an ontologically ambiguous “reflection” that simultaneously hides and manifests its meta-
ontological Principle. In drawing these connections, I hope to show how the concept of non-
duality provides the possibility for a mutual understanding among diverse traditions at the 
philosophical level. 
 






The concept of “non-duality” is not the exclusive possession of any one philosophical 
system. On the contrary, it can be found—mutatis mutandis—within religio-
philosophical traditions the world over: from Philosophical Daoism, Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, and Advaita Vedānta Hinduism in the East, to Kabbalistic Judaism, esoteric 
Christianity, and mystical Islam in the West. As such, the concept of non-duality 
provides a common point of departure by which these traditions, despite their diverse 
and often disparate outlooks, might pursue a meaningful dialogue and, it is hoped, 
realize a degree of mutual understanding at the philosophical level (Izutsu 1983, 469).  
________________________ 
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  To that end, I propose to comparatively analyze the concept of non-duality as set 
forth in the works of the two highly celebrated figures of Śaṅkara (c. 8th century C.E.) 
and Nicholas Cusanus (1401-1464 C.E.), representing the Advaitic and Christian-
esoteric formulations of non-duality, respectively. In doing so, I aim to demonstrate 
how the speculative insights of both figures, the estrangement of their historico-cultural 
settings notwithstanding, bear a remarkable affinity in their notions of (1) the 
“Absolute”—Śaṅkara’s Brahman and Cusanus’s Deus—as an infinite unity that 
transcends all determinations (“no-thing”) and exceeds all oppositions (“not-other”), 
and (2) the world as an ontologically ambiguous “reflection” or “shadow” that 
simultaneously hides and manifests its meta-ontological Principle. 
 
2.  THE CONCEPT OF NON-DUALITY 
 
Before delving into a comparative analysis of these figures, I must first clarify what I 
mean by the term “non-duality.” Succinctly stated, “non-duality” refers to the 
transcendental “unity of opposites” (coincidentia oppositorum). According to non-dual 
traditions, there are not two different realities: an Absolute Reality “up there,” and a 
relative reality “down here.” Rather, the Absolute is the “One without a second.” It 
alone is. Everything “else” is said “to be” only in a relative, dependent, and 
participatory way. The world has no reality of its own. It is therefore, when viewed 
from the standpoint of its own internal resources, what the mystics of various traditions 
analogously refer to as an “illusion” (Śaṅkara), a “strange amorphousness” (Zhuang 
Zi), a “total reliance” (Dōgen), a “mixed darkness” (Cordovero), and even a sheer 
“nothing” (Meister Eckhart and Ibn ‘Arabī). 
This view poses a direct challenge to the so-called “common-sense” notion of 
reality. In our ordinary, everyday way of thinking, to say that a flower is “red” and to 
say that a flower “exists” are two structurally identical statements. The predicates of 
“redness” and “existence” are here both construed as merely accidental to the “essence” 
or “quiddity” of which they are predicated, namely, that of a “flower.” The non-dual 
perspective subverts this understanding with what amounts to nothing less than a 
metaphysical revolution: it is not, strictly speaking, the flower that exists, but existence 
that “flowers”—“here” in one way (e.g., a rose), and “there” in another (e.g., a lily, a 
crocus, an orchid, etc.) (Izutsu 1980, 290). Everything is a total dynamic manifestation 
of the Real, and therefore ontologically ambiguous. On the one hand, the world is 
rightly spoken of as a “shadow,” a “dream,” or an “illusion,” in that there “is” nothing 
but the One Real. On the other hand, however, the world is also said “to exist” in the 
same way that a wave is said “to be” the ocean, or a ray of light is said “to be” the sun 
(Mukhyananda 1987/2015, 101). Accordingly, all phenomena “are” only as the discrete 
manifestations of a single meta-ontological Principle or “Field”: the Oneness that is 
two-less. 
Non-dual “oneness” is therefore not a mathematical but a metaphysical concept. It 
is not “one” in contrast to the “many”; nor is it “one” as the sum of all parts. 
Transcending every determination and exceeding every opposition, it is “neither this 
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however, what most differentiates the “one” from all things is its total indistinction 
from them, i.e., its “not-otherness.” More than a merely negative concept, then, non-
duality is interpreted as a plenitudinous “void” or super-abounding “abyss,” negating 
every negation, and transcending even transcendence.  
The metaphysics of Mahāyāna Buddhism speaks of this non-dual Reality in terms 
of “emptiness” (śūnyatā); a boundless circle with no “inside” or “outside”; an infinite 
field where “there is not an inch of grass growing.” Philosophical Daoism compares it 
to an “Uncarved Block” (pu),1 a sheer ipseity absolved of all forms, names, distinctions, 
qualities, and relations: “The dao that can be told is not the Eternal Dao.”2 Similarly, 
the Kabbalistic tradition within Judaism refers to non-dual Reality by the name of Ein 
Sof (lit. “endless”), a Reality that “is all one and the same,” and “nothing is separate 
from it” (Matt 1996, 27)—what Islamic mysticism designates as the “oneness of 
existence” (waḥdat al-wujūd). 
The concept of non-duality therefore cannot simply be written off as just one more 
philosophically refined way of saying “God.” After all, the idea of Divinity implies 
relationality of one kind or another (e.g., Creator-creature, Lord-servant, Worshipped-
worshipper, etc.). One might even go so far as to say that, taken at its purest level of 
analysis, the concept of non-duality has nothing at all to do with “God.” As Eckhart 
could say, non-dual oneness is the “stage” of existence at which every possible 
distinction has been “broken through,” and therefore at which even “God passes away” 
(Pfeiffer 1857, 181). Yet to call the concept of non-duality “a-theistic” would be no 
less of a misnomer. Trans-theistic would be the better term, in that the proper notion of 
non-dual oneness is the reconciliation and mutual indwelling of all contraries and 
contradictions in a unity so unconditional that it transcends even the condition of being 
unconditioned (Abe 1995, 146).  
None of this is to suggest that the concept of non-duality is the same in all traditions, 
however. Just the opposite. Non-duality plays a vastly different role in Eastern and 
Western thought. In Daoist, Mahāyānic, and Advaitic traditions, for example, the 
concept of non-duality functions on analogy to the sun. It is the shining center of 
everything—that in the light of which everything else becomes known.3 The role of 
non-duality in Western traditions, by contrast, is more analogous to the way sudden, 
sporadic flashes of lightning flicker in a dark sky, appearing “out of nowhere,” it would 
seem, and vanishing just as quickly. Or to shift analogies: the concept of non-duality 
in the West is comparable to “a seed which, however often sown, has never found fertile 
soil” (Loy 2019, xvii).  
This is especially the case with respect to modern Western thought. It is no mere 
coincidence that the standard genealogy of modern Western philosophy begins with 
Descartes and his premise of a bifurcated cosmos composed of two realities: (1) 
“thinking reality” (res cogitans), and (2) “extended reality” (res extensa). From this 
premise, itself rooted in the nominalist and skeptical philosophies of previous centuries, 
 
1 Dao-De-Jing, Ch. 32. 
2 Dao-De-Jing, Ch. 1. 
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there arose a kind of ontological “split-vision” through which the dichotomies of 
subject and object, knower and known, self and other were effectively absolutized and 
the thread of their intelligible connection severed (Dupré 2008, 11).  
It is this bifurcated view of the world which, more than any other, has come to 
characterize the modern mindset—which, due to globalization, is now as much an 
Eastern as a Western affair. The peculiar “ontology” that this mindset has tended to 
harbor, even if it should deny entertaining or privileging any philosophical system 
whatsoever, goes by the name of “essentialism,” the driving logic of which assumes 
the universal applicability of the laws of identity and non-contradiction, i.e., that A is 
A and therefore cannot be non-A; that B is B and therefore cannot be non-B; etc. Here 
A and B are conceived as two discrete “things” or “substances” that exist independently 
of each other and relate, if at all, in a merely post hoc, tangential way.  
The consequences of this perspective have been both remarkable and devastating. 
It cannot be doubted that the restriction of “knowledge” (scientia) to that which can be 
quantifiably analyzed has led to monumental discoveries and advancements in the 
realms of medicine, technology, and industry. No less undoubtable, however, is the fact 
that this very same restriction has produced a certain “blindness” to the holistic quality 
of things, such that modern humanity has become seemingly incapable of recognizing 
“landscapes as wholes, let alone as the homes of people and other creatures”, and 
instead as little more than the fragmented “sources of extractable products” (Berry, 
2015, 6). This predatory stance vis-à-vis the phenomenal order has been inclined to 
construe nature as a “thing” or “object” to be conquered, put on the rack and tortured 
for her secrets, with precious few—if any—objectives beyond those of technological 
efficiency and “economic yield” (Ellul 1964, 15).   
Against these bifurcating and reductivist tendencies, the concept of non-duality 
seeks to reintegrate all forms of being and knowledge, humanity and nature, within the 
undifferentiated field of what the late Kitarō Nishida (1870-1945), following Cusanus, 
had termed their “contradictory identity” (mujunteki dōitsu) (Nishida, 1987, 103), 
attained through the immediate, intuitive grasp of Reality “prior”—metaphysically 
speaking—to its having become bifurcated into the categories of subject and object, 
knower and known, self and other (Alston 1980/2004, 6). For the Zen Buddhist, this 
Reality is known as “the face all things had before their fathers and mothers were born.” 
For the Sufi, it is conceived as one’s “original nature” (fiṭrah). And for the Advaitin, it 
is experienced as the realization of the great Upaniṣadic pronouncement 
(mahāvākyam)—what Max Müller had called “the boldest and truest synthesis in the 
whole history of philosophy”: “Thou art that” (tat tvam asi) (Müller 1919, 122). 
Having briefly clarified my use of the term “non-duality,” I turn now to a 
comparative analysis of Śaṅkara and Cusanus, and the non-dual traditions they 
represent.  
 
3.  ŚAṄKARA AND ADVAITA VEDĀNTA HINDUISM 
 
The Advaitic understanding of existence (sat) is that of a pure, non-dual unity. This 
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(Mahadevan 1938/1999, 99). Existence is not a thing to be counted. Perfectly simple, 
it is without parts. Perfectly infinite, it is beyond enumeration. As a pure, homogenous 
plenum (bhūmā), existence is beyond all division and diminishment, such that to it, 
nothing can be added, and from it, nothing can be taken away. Sat is therefore not “one” 
in contrast to “the many,” nor a “whole” in relation to its “parts,” but an infinite unity, 
a seamless simplicity, where nothing is different from anything else: “O One of infinite 
forms!”4  
In the philosophy of Śaṅkara, the concept of non-duality functions as a method of 
identifying Brahman as the existentiating act and metaphysical substratum of all 
existents, the super-essential “mode” which, simply by virtue of being what it is, makes 
all things to be what they are (Pande 1994, 247). As such, existence or sat is not a thing 
among other things or an object in relation to other objects. “Neither this nor that” (neti, 
neti) it is the “one without a second” (ekam eva advitīyam). Put another way: the non-
dual oneness of Brahman transcends all determinations (“no-thing”) and exceeds all 
oppositions (“not-other”).  
The fundamental claim of Advaitic ontology is that only Brahman is “really real” 
(satyasya satyam). It alone is void of every difference (viśeṣa), quality (guṇa), 
limitation (upādhi), and form (ākāra) (Deussen 2012, 205; Isayeva 1993, 52). This 
claim is maintained by Śaṅkara through the distinction—often misunderstood—
between Brahman “with attributes” (saguṇa) and Brahman “without attributes” 
(nirguṇa), a distinction otherwise referred to as “lower” (apara) and “higher” (para) 
Brahman. To grasp this distinction, it is essential to acknowledge that, for Śaṅkara, 
there are not two absolutes, one ineffable and the other nameable, one higher and the 
other lower. Both refer to the same exact reality, albeit as perceived from two radically 
different standpoints or levels of consciousness: (1) the phenomenal (saprapañca) and 
(2) the transcendental (niṣprapañca). It is in this way that pure existence (sat), though 
one in itself, is grasped under the two opposed aspects (dvirūpa) of its transcendence 
(“no-thingness”) and immanence (“not-otherness”). 
To the “lower” Brahman applies the manifold predications of attributes, names, and 
forms. This is the personal God or Īśvara whose existence is inseparable from the 
phenomenal order and of whom one may speak as the causative Principle of all things. 
This causative Principle or Creator-Deity is said to have “produced” or “emanated” the 
world from Itself as a fire emits its sparks, a spider weaves its web, or a flute produces 
its music. The manifold of phenomena is, from this perspective, no miscellany of 
arbitrary inventions that a “divine being” has fashioned “out of nothing” (as in some 
interpretations of the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo), but the many 
manifestations of oneness itself (advayatā). It is in this way that all “ontophany” (the 
manifestation of existence) is seen as “henophany” (the manifestation of oneness). 
To the “higher” Brahman, by contrast with the “lower,” no attribute, name, or form 
applies. As Śaṅkara says, to “the transcendental Brahman, beyond all conditions, there 
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can be no such ascription.”5 The “really real” or “absolutely absolute” is “beyond all 
concepts and all words,” such that even those negative or apophatic attributions like 
invisibility, immutability, and so forth are all infinitely surpassed. Or as Śaṅkara writes 
elsewhere, “Words with the mind turn back without reaching It as It is without qualities, 
without actions and without attributes.”6  
This denial of all names and forms to non-dual existence must not be understood in 
a merely negative way, however. The absolute manifests itself at every grade of 
relativity without forfeiting its limitlessness, and that because it has no dialectical 
relation to it. Finitude, far from something “other” than the infinite, is the latter’s 
contracted expression, just as form (rūpa) is the limited expression of the formless 
(arūpa). Śaṅkara thus regards the most profound statements of the Upaniṣads to have 
for their primary concern not a personal Creator-Deity or transcendent Being of endless 
qualities (saguṇa Brahman), but absolute and unqualified existence as such (nirguṇa 
Brahman), i.e., “the impersonal (or super-personal) ground in and through which 
manifestation takes place, itself bereft of all finite characteristics” (Alston 1980/2004, 
5). Or as Toshihiko Izutsu summarizes the philosophical vision of Śaṅkara: 
 
…the Absolute which is indicated by the word Brahman is conceived as pure being or 
“existence” (Sat)—all-pervasive, non-temporal, non-spatial, absolutely unqualified and 
unlimited—which all so-called “things” are considered so many determinations and 
particularizations of this absolute Indeterminate…whenever we perceive something in this 
world we are in reality perceiving Brahman itself, not in its absolute aspect, to be sure, but 
in one of its particular phenomenal forms (Izutsu 1991, 39, 44). 
 
This, in turn, begs an important question: how can the non-dual absolute remain 
itself throughout the varied stages of manifold relativity? If, as the famous phrase 
ascribed to Śaṅkara puts it, “the world is an unbroken series of intuitions of Brahman”, 
then how can the world at the same time be “in all respects nothing but Brahman”?7 
Here it must be said that just as the saguṇa Brahman is not a reality “in addition to” the 
nirguṇa Brahman, so also the latter does not in any way “become” or “change into” the 
former. The absolute qua absolute remains eternally unaltered and unalterable. It is 
itself forever. Brahman does not “become” Īśvara. On the contrary, Īśvara is Brahman, 
though as viewed from the plane of phenomenal perception (saprapañca). What is 
more, the ineffable, non-dual oneness of the absolute abides undiminished throughout 
the descending degrees of its manifestation, from the pure act of existence (sat) down 
to the pure possibility of prakṛti (the material principle of nature, corresponding to the 
Aristotelian notion of hylē or materia prima).  
It is only at this level of parabrahmanic oneness that phenomena can be seen for 
what they “are”: not so many insular “essences” or independent ontological “units” all 
 
5 In Eight Upaniṣads: With the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya, 2 vols., trans. Swāmī Gambhīrānanda, 
Kolkata, Advaita Ashrama 1957/2018, 1:385. 
6 Upadeśa Sāhasrī (“A Thousand Teachings”), trans. Swāmi Jagadānanda, Mylapore, Sri Ramakrishna 
Math Printing Press, 1941/2018, Ch. 15, v. 31. 
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neatly cordoned off from each other, but the mutually interpenetrating modes of non-
dual oneness, each indwelling all and all indwelling each. As Alston writes: 
  
All is one, and that one an eternal mass of homogenous light. But as one fire breaks up into 
many sparks without losing its unity, so does the one Self (atman) of all assume the form 
of the objects of the world and enter into living beings as their “living soul” without 
forfeiting its essential unity (2004, 5). 
 
Śaṅkara accordingly speaks of Brahman as the Self (ātman) who abides at the 
“heart” or “viscera” (āśaya) of all beings (bhūtānāṁ). Brahman is the beginning (ādi), 
the middle (madhyam), and the end (antaḥ) of the universe. As the inner sense or 
meaning of all things, Brahman is the Self that is “to be meditated on, always.”8 Every 
phenomenal encounter is therefore an encounter with the trans-phenomenal Brahman, 
just as to be splashed with a wave is the same as being splashed by the ocean, or to bask 
in a ray of light is the same as basking in the sun itself: “Of the luminaries that illumine, 
I am the radiant sun.”9 
As the causative principle of manifestation, Brahman is “the seed of all beings” 
(sarvabhūtānāṁ bījaṁ) and “the Self of all”, such that whatever is without Brahman is 
“null and void.”10 This brings us to what is undoubtedly one of the key concepts of 
Śaṅkara’s entire philosophy: māyā. While commonly translated as “illusion” and 
dismissed as acosmic or nihilistic, māyā is of a far more nuanced significance, having 
not only a negative, but a positive aspect as well.  
Negatively, māyā hides Brahman like a veil hides a face or fog hides a path. 
Understood in this way, the world is a dream spun of dreams, or a shadow woven of 
shadows, all of which deceive us into thinking that they are ultimately real. This 
accords with the so-called “common-sense” notion of what it means to “exist.” From 
the perspective of the lower, relative levels of sat, we speak of what is “real” 
indiscriminately. We point and say, for example, that “The stone is real” or that “The 
tree is real” or that “The river is real,” etc. But are they? For the Advaitin, the answer 
is both yes and no. The stone is the appearance of Brahman as a stone. Or to use one 
of Śaṅkara’s preferred analogies, what looks to be a serpent (but, in actuality, is a rope) 
cannot be nothing (asat) pure and simple, since what is “nothing” has no look to give. 
The appearance of the serpent is instead a strictly relative and relational borrowing of 
existence, i.e., a sheer participation in what is “really real”—the one true Reality in 
relation to which all “else” is shown to be (ultimately) “false.” 
Which leads now to the positive aspect of māyā. Beyond its illusory connotations, 
māyā is also considered to be the theatre of “sacred play” (līlā), the cosmic dance of 
Brahman. “Divine indeed is this illusion of mine.”11 Māyā is not only a veil that hides 
reality. It is also a mirror that reveals it. Whereas the veiling power (āvaraṇa-śakti) of 
 
8 In Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, translated by A.G. Krishna Warrier, Mylapore, 
Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1983, Ch. 10, v. 20 (hereafter cited as SBGB). 
9 SBGB, ibid. 
10 SBGB, Ch. 10, vv. 39-40. 
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māyā serves to obscure the truth (or “realness”) of existence, its projecting power 
(vikṣepa-śakti) functions something like the heat that spontaneously irradiates from a 
fire. It is the saguṇa Brahman or personal Creator-Deity who wields the power of māyā 
in this way, at once transcendent and immanent, the Oversoul (Paramātman) and 
Esoteric Ruler (Antaryāmīn) of manifestation. “There is nothing in this world which is 
not lit up by God” (Radhakrishnan 1953/1999, 85). 
For Śaṅkara, then, the whole world “reflects” or “shadows forth” these two opposed 
aspects of the non-dual absolute, such that every phenomenon both hides (“no-thing”) 
and manifests (“not-other”) its meta-ontological Principle. For Śaṅkara, all things “are” 
only as the contracted expressions of the Infinite (ananta). In themselves, they are 
nothing—or as Śaṅkara says, “null and void”; but in the Infinite, they are not different 
from the Infinite, i.e., that which is “beyond all determinations” (“no-thing”) and from 
which “nothing is divorced” (“not-other”).12  
To summarize, Śaṅkara’s use of the concept of non-duality functions as a method 
by which to identify and delineate the following two principles: (1) the “Absolute” 
(Brahman) is an infinite unity that transcends all determinations (“no-thing”) and 
exceeds all oppositions (“not-other”), and (2) the world is an ontologically ambiguous 
“reflection” or “shadow” (māyā) that simultaneously hides and manifests its meta-
ontological Principle. Having provided the basic outline of Śaṅkara’s non-dual 
philosophy, I turn now to an exposition and comparison of the concept of non-duality 
as articulated in the work of the outstanding Christian mystic, theologian, and 
philosopher, Nicholas Cusanus.  
 
4.  NICHOLAS CUSANUS AND ESOTERIC CHRISTIANITY 
 
Those already acquainted with the writings of Cusanus will know them to be of a 
“speculative and highly metaphysical character”, even a philosophical labyrinth filled 
with “cryptic and startling utterances” (Hopkins 1980, 8, 12). Despite its daunting 
quality, however, the German Cardinal’s vast oeuvre is not without its controlling 
concept: non-duality.  
The concept of non-duality was first brought to the surface of Christian thought by 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (c. 5th-6th centuries C.E.) and his Mystical Theology 
specifically. Cusanus attributed his own notion of God as non-aliud (“not-other”) to 
the intimations of non-duality he had unearthed in the Dionysian corpus:  
 
Dionysius...seems to have come closest to it [i.e., the concept of non-duality]. For in all the 
things which he expresses in various ways, he elucidates Not-other. But when he comes to 
the end of his Mystical Theology, he maintains that the Creator is neither anything 
nameable nor any other thing whatever. Yet, he says this in such a way that he there appears 
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not to be setting forth any important point—although, for one who is attentive, he expressed 
the secret of Not-other, which secret he everywhere exhibited in one way or another.13 
 
At the close of his Mystical Theology, Dionysius had explicitly rejected all 
affirmations and negations as predicated of the Godhead. For the anonymous monk, 
human thought and language are rendered impotent before the “dazzling darkness” of 
the Divine Essence, as the eyes of an owl are overwhelmed by the light of the sun. 
From it, all speech is put to flight—or, to borrow the phrase of Śaṅkara, “Words with 
the mind turn back.” The non-dual oneness of existence is neither here nor there, neither 
this nor that, neither dark nor light, neither false nor true.14 In that God is absolute, God 
is not reducible to any one phenomenon or attribute, nor to the whole gamut of 
phenomena or attributes put together. As Dionysius writes, the Absolute is “beyond the 
whole” (epekéina tōn holōn). And yet, in that the Absolute is also Infinite, it is not 
simply other than or different from phenomena either. It was in this way that Cusanus 
had perceived in the Areopagite a profound elucidation of the concept of non-aliud, if 
only as an implicit “secret”—one that the “attentive” mind nevertheless discerns 
“everywhere exhibited in one way or another.” 
For Cusanus, as for Dionysius, God is the “absolute form” (forma absoluta) of 
existence. The entire cosmos is therefore viewed as a kind of prolongation or unfolding 
(explicatio), albeit imperfect, of God—what Dionysius had termed theophanía or 
“manifestation of the Divine” (Perl 2007, 32). The imperfection of the world is due 
precisely to its being finite, a contracted “reflection” (resplendentia) of the Divine 
Essence (Hopkins 1980, 38). Insofar as the cosmos is a reflection of the image of God—
the God whom Cusanus, following Dionysius and echoing Śaṅkara, calls the “being of 
all beings” (omnium esse)15—it reveals the ineffable light of its Principle. Yet, at the 
very same time, insofar as the cosmos is a reflection of the image of God, it renders 
that Principle hidden, and for the very reason that it is not itself that Principle. The 
ontological status of the world is thus, from the Cusanean perspective, fundamentally 
ambiguous, akin to a luminous shadow (or shadowy luminosity). To that extent, it may 
be rightly compared to the Vedāntic notion of “illusion” (māyā), according to which 
the world, like a mirage in the desert, “lies.” How does it “lie”? By presenting as 
manifold that which exists in God as a purely undifferentiated unity (complicatio), “a 
unity which embraces not only the different, but even the opposite, qualities or 
determinations of being” (Koyré 1957, 8-9). 
Cusanus speaks of the unity of existence as both a “coincidence of opposites” 
(coincidentia oppositorum) and a “coincidence of contradictories” (coincidentiam 
contradictoriorum). And while these terms might appear, at first glance, to be basically 
synonymous, a more probing analysis reveals a crucial distinction. The former term 
 
13 De Li Non Aliud, Ch. 1, in Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-Other: A Translation and an Appraisal of 
De Li Non Aliud, edited and translated by Jasper Hopkins, 3rd edition (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning 
Press, 1987), 34-37. 
14 Mystical Theology, Bk. 5, 1048A, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Divine Names and Mystical Theology, 
edited and translated by John D. Jones (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press), 2015, 222.  
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embraces the latter without being simply reducible to it, so as to enfold not only 
contradictories (e.g., non-being and Being) but contraries as well (e.g., motion and rest).  
Furthermore, Cusanus never identifies the coincidence of opposites with the Divine 
Essence Itself. Like the nirguṇa Brahman of Śaṅkara, the Godhead of Cusanus not only 
transcends every affirmation, but every possible negation as well. God is, for Cusanus, 
a “simple oneness” (simplex unitas), a non-dual unity that is “prior-to-all-number” 
(ante omnem numerum) and “discrete quantity” (quantitate discreta).16 What is more, 
the “simple oneness” of the absolute is—paradoxically—threefold, as represented by 
the trinitarian formula “Father-Son-Spirit” or “Object-Subject-Union,” corresponding 
to the tertiary formula of the Vedānta: sat-cit-ānanda (“Existence-Knowledge-Bliss”). 
This trinitarian relation occurs, says Cusanus, “inside the wall of coincidence” 
(intra murum coincidentiae), “where the distinct and the indistinct coincide” (ubi 
distinctum et indistinctum coincidunt).17 Here Cusanus follows the principle of his 
fellow German mystic, Meister Eckhart: “everything is in everything.” As Bernard 
McGinn notes, “Eckhart, and after him Nicholas of Cusa, adapted this principle [from 
Pre-Socratic sources] to describe not only the interpenetration of all things in the 
universe but also the divine omnipresent transcendence” (McGinn 2001, 169). For 
Cusanus, non-dual transcendence is the context or setting within which the 
“coincidence of opposites” occurs and therefore cannot be equated with that 
coincidence itself. In other words, the coincidentia oppositorum occurs in the Infinite 
but not as the Infinite. The logic of this move would seem to imply a further (and indeed 
final) distinction—along the lines of the one drawn by Eckhart and, in a corresponding 
way, Śaṅkara—between (1) God as the personal, self-giving principle of the cosmos 
(“God” or aparabrahman), and (2) God as the absolute, trans-personal oneness beyond 
every possible distinction, attribution, and relation (“Godhead” or parabrahman). It is 
this “oneness” of which even the Trinity itself is but a reflection, albeit as projected 
onto the “inner wall of coincidence.”  
As such, the oneness of the Godhead is not a relative or dialectical oneness. That is 
to say, it is not a oneness set over against multiplicity and difference. Rather, it is an 
infinite oneness, perfectly unique (“no-thing”) and perfectly universal (“not-other”). As 
sheer infinity, God is equidistant to every individual point of the universe, in that, like 
an infinite circle, God’s center is everywhere and God’s circumference is nowhere.18 
The non-dual unity of existence is that in which transcendence and immanence “meet,” 
so to speak, not as ontological rivals or competitors, but as the mutually interpenetrating 
modes of a single, undivided Reality. The Divine Essence, says Cusanus, is neither 
“here” nor “there,” “nor is it this rather than that.”19 It is instead “a mode of unity that 
 
16 Trialogus De Possest, §46, in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, edited 
and translated by Jaspar Hopkins, 2nd edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 38. 
17  De Visione Dei, Ch. 17, in Nicholas of Cusa’s Dialectical Mysticism: Text, Translation, and 
Interpretive Study of De visione Dei, edited and translated by Jasper Hopkins, 2nd edition (Minneapolis: 
Banner, 1996), 210-211.   
18 De Docta Ignorantia, Bk. 2, Ch. 12, in Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Spiritual Writings, translated by H. 
Lawrence Bond (New York: Paulist Press, 1997), 161. 
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comprises difference without eradicating it” (Casarella 2009, 143). This corresponds 
to Śaṅkara’s view of Brahman as neti, neti and ekam eva advitīyam, the One (“no-
thing”) without a second (“not-other”). 
The concept of non-duality is thus employed by Cusanus as a “way of viewing and 
of solving problems from the standpoint of infinity”, and in this sense “provides a 
method that resolves contradictions without violating the integrity of the contrary 
elements and without diminishing the reality or the force of their contradiction” (Bond, 
1997, 22). According to Cusanus, the movement of thought (and theo-logical thinking 
in particular) proceeds in the shape of a circle (in circulo).20 As an infinite circle, God 
does not view creation as a compromising threat to God’s own Self-Reality. God is the 
boundless center (“no-thing”) and circumference (“not-other”) of all things, such that 
to see one is to see the other (Hoff 2013, 166). 
For Cusanus, then, as for Śaṅkara, finitude is not, strictly speaking, “other” than the 
infinite. Just as form (rūpa) is the contracted expression of the formless (arūpa), so 
creation is a contracted expression of its Creator, and the Creator, in turn, a revelation 
of non-dual oneness. As such, the world is an icon (eiconam) of shadow and light, and 
every manifestation of being (ontophany) is convertible with the manifestation of 
oneness (henophany)—be it a star or a stone, a face or a flower. As the “Absolute Being 
of all things” (Absolutum esse omnium), God is therefore “the Face of faces” (facies 
facierum), i.e., the Face that “precedes every formable face and is the Exemplar and 
Truth of all faces.” Every phenomenal “face” is a “contracted shadow-like image” 
(umbra...contracta), a limited articulation of the Limitless, as waves are the limited 
articulations of the ocean, or rays of light are the limited articulations of the sun. And 
just as the brilliance of a ray is not-other-than the sun from which it is derived, so every 
face that looks to the Absolute “sees nothing other than itself or different from itself, 




In this paper I have attempted to comparatively analyze and evaluate the diverse 
philosophical traditions of Advaita Vedānta Hinduism and esoteric Christianity 
through their use of the concept of “non-dual oneness,” as represented by the figures 
of Śaṅkara and Cusanus, respectively. Without denying the radical differences and 
innumerable disparities that obtain between these traditions, I have sought to 
demonstrate how the speculative insights of Śaṅkara and Cusanus bear a remarkable 
affinity and philosophical overlap in their notions of (1) the “Absolute” (Brahman; 
Deus) as an infinite unity that transcends all determinations (“no-thing”) and exceeds 
all oppositions (“not-other”); and (2) the world as an ontologically ambiguous 
“reflection” or “shadow” (māyā; umbra) that simultaneously hides and manifests its 
meta-ontological Principle. 
 
20 De Visione Dei, Ch. 3. 
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When comparing traditions so diverse, it becomes necessary to establish a common 
point of departure. It is my contention that the concept of non-duality provides such a 
“point” in being both (1) specific enough to identify a core set of well-defined 
principles amenable to systematic study and (2) general enough to permeate the 
thought-forms of each tradition, thereby allowing for the sort of shared language and 
structural frame of reference within which meaningful comparisons might be drawn 
and a mutual understanding more fruitfully developed.  
In what is an increasingly pluralistic situation, the need for a mutual understanding 
among disparate cultures, philosophies, and traditions has become more than a 
sentimental or pious wish, but an urgent task necessary for the flourishing of human 
civilizations and the survival of the world we together inhabit. 
While such an understanding is pursuable at any number of possible levels, it is the 
level of philosophy (philosophía, lit. “love of wisdom”) which, I contend, ranks among 
the most promising, if for no other reason than the universality of its impetus and aim. 
As Aristotle had put it in the opening line of his Metaphysicá: “All people by nature 
desire to know.”22 
Reduced to its broadest intention, then, what this paper has sought to demonstrate 
is how the concept of non-duality epitomizes that “philosophical drive of the human 
Mind” which, “regardless of ages, places and nations, [is] ultimately and fundamentally 
one” (Izutsu 1983, 469); and, as such, provides a common—and potentially fertile—
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